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We study the problem of allocating students to projects, where both students and lecturers
have preferences over projects, and both projects and lecturers have capacities. In this
context we seek a stable matching of students to projects, which respects these preference
and capacity constraints. Here, the stability deﬁnition generalises the corresponding notion
in the context of the classical Hospitals/Residents problem. We show that stable matchings
can have different sizes, which motivates max-spa-p, the problem of ﬁnding maximum
cardinality stable matching. We prove that max-spa-p is NP-hard and not approximable
within δ, for some δ > 1, unless P = NP. On the other hand, we give an approximation
algorithm with a performance guarantee of 2 for max-spa-p.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
As part of the senior level of many undergraduate degree courses, students are required to undertake some form of
project work. Typically the available projects are advertised to the students, and having browsed through the descriptions,
each student (either explicitly or implicitly) forms a preference list over the projects that he/she ﬁnds acceptable. Lecturers
may also have preferences over the students and/or the projects that they offer. There may also be upper bounds on the
number of students that can be assigned to a particular project, and the number of students that a given lecturer is willing
to supervise.
We refer to the problem of assigning students to projects subject to these preference lists and capacity constraints as the
Student-Project Allocation problem (spa). Given the large numbers of students that are typically involved in such applications,
there is a growing interest in automating the process of allocating students to projects using centralised matching schemes
that incorporate eﬃcient algorithms for spa. Examples of such automated systems are in use at the Department of Computer
Science, University of York [4,9,13], the University of Southampton [3,8] and elsewhere [12].
spa is a generalisation of the classical Hospitals/Residents problem (hr) [5,6] which has applications to the annual match of
graduating medical students (or residents) to their ﬁrst hospital posts in a number of countries [11]. In the US, for example,
the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) deals with the allocation of some 31,000 medical students annually. The
NRMP utilises an algorithm that essentially solves an extension of hr, forming a stable matching of residents to hospitals,
taking into account hospital capacities, and the preferences of residents over hospitals and vice versa. Informally, a matching
guarantees that no resident is assigned to more than one hospital, and no hospital is assigned more residents than its
capacity, whilst the concept of stability ensures that no resident and hospital who are not matched together would rather
✩ A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of ACiD 2005: the 1st Algorithms and Complexity in Durham Workshop, volume 4 of Texts in
Algorithmics, pages 69–80, KCL Publications, 2005.
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s1: p1 p2 l1: p1
s2: p1 l2: p2
c1 = c2 = d1 = d2 = 1
Fig. 1. An instance I1 of spa-p.
be assigned to each other than remain with their current assignees. Such a pair could improve their situations by coming
to a private arrangement outside of the matching, undermining its integrity. It has been convincingly argued [11] that,
when preference lists exist on both sides of a two-sided matching market (for example, involving residents and hospitals,
or students and lecturers), the key property that a matching should satisfy is that of stability.
Stable matchings in the context of spa have been considered previously. In [1], a model for spa was introduced in which
students have preferences over projects, whilst lecturers have preferences over students. A linear-time algorithm for ﬁnding
a stable matching of students to projects in this context was described, in terms of a stability deﬁnition that is a natural
generalisation of stability in the context of hr. This algorithm constructs the student-optimal stable matching, in which each
student obtains the best project that he/she could obtain in any stable matching. A second linear-time algorithm [2] ﬁnds
the lecturer-optimal stable matching, in which each lecturer obtains the best (in a precise sense) set of students that he/she
could obtain in any stable matching.
In some cases, neither lecturers nor students ﬁnd it desirable that lecturers should form preference lists over students.
For example, if such lists are derived largely on the basis of academic merit, then students who have performed poorly in
previous examinations are less likely to be assigned to preferable projects if these projects are popular, and could therefore
struggle to improve their academic performance. However, often it is the case that lecturers have tangible preferences
over the projects that they offer. For example, a lecturer may strongly prefer to supervise a particular project if it is closely
connected with his research. In this paper we consider the variant of spa in which lecturers rank in strict order of preference
the projects that they offer. Under this condition, implicitly each lecturer is indifferent among those students who ﬁnd
acceptable a given project that he/she offers.
Our contribution is as follows. In Section 2 we give a formal deﬁnition of the variant of spa in which lecturers have
preferences over projects, which we refer to as spa-p, formulating an appropriate stability deﬁnition in this context. A stable
matching M guarantees that (i) no student and lecturer could improve relative to M by forming a private arrangement
involving some project, and (ii) no coalition of students could permute their assigned projects in M so as to improve their
allocation. We show that, in a given instance of spa-p, stable matchings can have different sizes. In most practical situa-
tions we seek to allocate as many students to projects as possible, and this motivates the problem of ﬁnding a maximum
cardinality stable matching (henceforth a maximum stable matching). In Section 3 we show that this problem is NP-hard
and not approximable within δ, for some δ > 1, unless P = NP. The result holds even in the special case that each project
and lecturer can accommodate only one student, and each person’s preference list is of bounded length. However in Sec-
tion 4, we give an approximation algorithm for the problem that admits a performance guarantee of 2. This algorithm also
demonstrates that every instance of spa-p admits at least one stable matching. Finally, Section 5 contains some concluding
remarks.
We remark that spa-p is an example of a matching problem in which the members of two sets of entities (namely the
students and lecturers) each have preferences over the members of a common third entity (namely the projects). As far as
we are aware, spa-p is the ﬁrst matching problem of this type to be considered in the literature. The previous formulations
of spa to have been considered either do not permit lecturer preferences [3,8,10,12] (so stability is not relevant in these
contexts) or involve lecturer preferences over students [1,2,4,9,13].
2. Deﬁnition of SPA-P
We begin by deﬁning an instance of spa-p, the Student-Project Allocation problem with preferences over Projects. An
instance of spa-p involves a set S of students, a set P of projects, and a set L of lecturers. Each lecturer lk ∈ L offers a set
of projects, denoted by Pk . We assume that P1, . . . , Pq partitions P , where q = |L|, so that each project is offered by a
unique lecturer. Also, each student si ∈ S has an acceptable set of projects Ai ⊆ P . Moreover si ranks Ai in strict order of
preference. Similarly lk ranks Pk in strict order of preference. Finally, each project p j ∈P and lecturer lk ∈L has a positive
capacity, denoted by c j and dk , respectively.
An example spa-p instance with S = {s1, s2}, P = {p1, p2} and L = {l1, l2}, where A1 = {p1, p2}, A2 = {p1}, P1 = {p1}
and P2 = {p2}, is shown in Fig. 1.
An assignment M is a subset of S ×P such that (si, p j) ∈ M implies that p j ∈ Ai (i.e. si ﬁnds p j acceptable). If (si, p j) ∈
M , we say that si is assigned to p j , and p j is assigned si . For ease of exposition, if si is assigned to p j and lk is the lecturer
who offers p j , we may also say that si is assigned to lk , and lk is assigned si .
For each r ∈ S ∪ P ∪ L, we denote by M(r) the set of assignees of r in M . If si ∈ S and M(si) = ∅, we say that si is
unassigned, otherwise si is assigned. Similarly, any project p j ∈ P is under-subscribed, full or over-subscribed according as
|M(p j)| is less than, equal to, or greater than c j , respectively. The same three terms are deﬁned for a lecturer lk ∈ L with
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Fig. 2. An instance I2 of spa-p.
respect to lk ’s capacity dk . A project p j ∈ P is said to be non-empty if |M(p j)| > 0. Similarly a lecturer lk ∈ L is said to be
non-empty if |M(lk)| > 0.
A matching M is an assignment such that |M(si)| 1 for each si ∈ S , |M(p j)| c j for each p j ∈P , and |M(lk)| dk for
each lk ∈L (i.e. each student is assigned to at most one project, and no project or lecturer is over-subscribed). For notational
convenience, given a matching M and a student si ∈ S such that M(si) = ∅, where there is no ambiguity the notation M(si)
is also used to refer to the single member of M(si).
A (student, project) pair (si, p j) ∈ (S ×P)\M blocks a matching M , or is a blocking pair of M , if the following conditions
are satisﬁed relative to M:
1. p j ∈ Ai (i.e. si ﬁnds p j acceptable);
2. either si is unassigned or si prefers p j to M(si);
3. p j is under-subscribed and either
(a) si ∈ M(lk) and lk prefers p j to M(si), or
(b) si /∈ M(lk) and lk is under-subscribed, or
(c) si /∈ M(lk) and lk is full and lk prefers p j to his worst non-empty project,
where lk is the lecturer who offers p j .
We now give some intuition for the deﬁnition of a blocking pair. Suppose that (si, p j) forms a blocking pair with respect
to matching M , and let lk be the lecturer who offers p j .
We assume that si prefers to be assigned to an acceptable project p j rather than remain unassigned, so Condition 2
indicates how a student could improve relative to M . We now consider Condition 3. If p j is already full, then lk would not
improve by rejecting a student assigned to p j and taking on si instead (recall that lk is indifferent among those students
who ﬁnd p j acceptable). Thus p j must be under-subscribed. Firstly suppose that si was already assigned to a project pr
offered by lk . In this case lk would only let si change projects from pr to p j if he prefers p j to pr—Condition 3(a). Secondly
suppose that si was not already assigned to a project offered by lk . If lk is under-subscribed then both p j and lk have a
free place for si—Condition 3(b). Otherwise if lk is full and lk prefers p j to his worst non-empty project pr , then lk could
improve by rejecting a student from pr and taking on si to do p j instead—Condition 3(c).
A blocking pair thus gives a situation in which a given matching M could be undermined. Another way in which this
could occur is through the existence of a coalition. A coalition is a set of students {si0 , . . . , sir−1 }, for some r  2, each of
whom is assigned in M , such that si j prefers M(si j+1) to M(si j ) (0  j  r − 1, where addition is taken modulo r). That
is, the students in the coalition could permute the projects that they have been assigned to in M so as to be better off.
Notice that, were such a permutation of projects to occur, the number of students assigned to each project and lecturer
would not change. Moreover, since each lecturer lk is implicitly indifferent between those students who ﬁnd acceptable a
given project offered by lk , the lecturers involved in the permutation have no explicit incentive to prevent the switch from
occurring. Fig. 2 gives a simple instance of spa-p in which the matching M = {(s1, p1), (s2, p2)} admits no blocking pair but
does admit a coalition, namely {s1, s2}. Deﬁne a matching to be coalition-free if it admits no coalition. We remark that, in the
context of hr, or spa variants involving lecturer preferences over students, a matching that admits no blocking pair cannot
admit a coalition of students (or residents), since the lecturers (or hospitals) involved would, by deﬁnition of a blocking
pair, be worse off were the switch to occur, and hence would not, in practice, agree to such a switch.
Deﬁne a matching to be stable if it admits no blocking pair and is coalition-free. It turns out that, with respect to this
deﬁnition, for a given instance of spa-p, stable matchings can have different sizes, as the example instance I1 shown in
Fig. 1 illustrates. It may be veriﬁed that each of the matchings M1 = {(s1, p1)} and M2 = {(s1, p2), (s2, p1)} is stable in I1.
In practical situations, often a key priority is to match as many students to acceptable projects as possible, so this naturally
leads one to consider the complexity of ﬁnding a maximum stable matching, given a spa-p instance.
3. Hardness of approximating a maximum stable matching
Given an instance I of spa-p, let s+(I) denote the maximum size of a stable matching in I . Deﬁne max-spa-p to be the
problem of computing s+(I), given an instance I of spa-p. In this section we show that max-spa-p is NP-hard, and moreover
that there exists a constant δ1 > 1 such that it is NP-hard to approximate max-spa-p within δ1. The result holds even if each
project and lecturer has capacity 1, and all preference lists are of bounded length.
We prove this result using a reduction from a problem relating to matchings in graphs. A matching M in a graph G
is said to be maximal if no proper superset of M is a matching in G . Let β−(G) denote the minimum size of a maximal1
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u1i : ri p ji pki ti (1 i  n1)
u2i : ri pki p ji (1 i  n1)
si: qi (1 i  n2)
Lecturer preferences:
⎧⎪⎨
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w j: p j q j (1 j  n2)
x j: r j (1 j  n1)
y j: t j (1 j  n1)
Fig. 3. Preference lists for the constructed instance of spa-p.
matching in G . Deﬁne min-mm to be the problem of computing β−1 (G), given a graph G . The following result regarding the
inapproximability of min-mm is proved in [7].
Theorem 1. Let G = (V , E) be an instance of min-mm, where m = |E|. Then there exist constants c0 > 0 and δ0 > 1 such that it is
NP-hard to distinguish between the cases β−1 (G) c0m and β
−
1 (G) > δ0c0m. Hence it is NP-hard to approximate min-mm within δ0 .
The result holds even for subdivision graphs3 of cubic graphs.
We will use Theorem 1 together with the notion of a gap-preserving reduction [14, p. 308], which may be deﬁned as
follows.
Deﬁnition 2. Let Π1 be a minimisation problem and let Π2 be a maximisation problem. Denote by OPTi(x) the optimal
measure over all feasible solutions for a given instance x of Πi (i ∈ {1,2}). Let α  1 be some constant and let g1 be a
function that maps an instance x of Π1 to a positive rational number. Then a gap-preserving reduction from Π1 to Π2 is a
tuple 〈 f , β, g2〉 such that:
• f maps an instance x of Π1 to an instance f (x) of Π2 in polynomial time;
• β  1 is a constant;
• g2 maps an instance f (x) of Π2 to a positive rational number;
• for any instance x of Π1:
◦ if OPT1(x) g1(x), then OPT2( f (x)) g2( f (x));
◦ if OPT1(x) > αg1(x), then OPT2( f (x)) < (1/β)g2( f (x)).
The following proposition is an immediate consequence of Deﬁnition 2.
Proposition 3. Let Π1 be a minimisation problem and let Π2 be a maximisation problem, and suppose that there is a gap-preserving
reduction from Π1 to Π2 . Assuming the notation of Deﬁnition 2, suppose further that it is NP-hard to distinguish between instances
x of Π1 such that OPT1(x) g1(x) and OPT1(x) > αg1(x). Then it is NP-hard to distinguish between instances f (x) of Π2 such that
OPT2( f (x)) g2( f (x)) and OPT2( f (x)) < (1/β)g2( f (x)). Hence it is NP-hard to approximate Π2 within β .
We use Proposition 3, together with Theorem 1, to prove the NP-hardness and inapproximability result for max-spa-p.
Theorem 4. max-spa-p is NP-hard. Moreover it is NP-hard to approximate max-spa-p within δ1 , for some δ1 > 1. The result holds
even if each project and lecturer has capacity 1, and all preference lists are of bounded length.
Proof. Let G (a subdivision graph of some cubic graph G ′) be an instance of min-mm. Then G is a bipartite graph, so that
G = (U ,W , E), where, without loss of generality, each vertex in U has degree 2 and each vertex in W has degree 3. Suppose
that n1 = |U | and n2 = |W |. Let U = {u1,u2, . . . ,un1 } and W = {w1,w2, . . . ,wn2 }. For each ui ∈ U , let w ji and wki be the
two neighbours of ui in G , where ji < ki .
We construct an instance I of spa-p as follows: let U 1 ∪ U2 ∪ S be the set of students, where U z = {uz1,uz2, . . . ,uzn1 } (1
z  2) and S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn2 }; let P ∪ Q ∪ R ∪ T be the set of projects, where P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn2 }, Q = {q1,q2, . . . ,qn2 },
R = {r1, r2, . . . , rn1 } and T = {t1, t2, . . . , tn1 }; and let W ∪ X ∪ Y be the set of lecturers, where X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn1 } and
Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yn1 }. Each project and lecturer has capacity 1. The preference lists in I are shown in Fig. 3. Clearly the
length of each student’s list is at most 4, whilst the length of each lecturer’s list is at most 2. These lists also indicate the
acceptable projects for each student, and the projects offered by each lecturer. We claim that s+(I) = 2n1 + n2 − β−1 (G).
3 Given a graph G , the subdivision graph of G , denoted by S(G), is obtained by subdividing each edge {u,w} of G in order to obtain two edges {u, v} and
{v,w} of S(G), where v is a new vertex.
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each edge {ui,w j} in M , if j = ji , add (u1i , p ji ) and (u2i , ri) to M ′ . If j = ki , add (u1i , ri) and (u2i , pki ) to M ′ . For each ui ∈ U ,
if ui is unassigned in M , add (u1i , ti) and (u
2
i , ri) to M
′ . For each w j ∈ W , if w j is unassigned in M , add (s j,q j) to M ′ .
No project in Q ∪ R can be involved in a blocking pair of M ′ , since each member of W ∪ X is full in M ′ . Hence no
student in S can be involved in a blocking pair of M ′ . Similarly no u2i ∈ U2 can be involved in a blocking pair of M ′ , since
u2i is assigned in M
′ to either his ﬁrst or second choice. Also no project in T can be involved in a blocking pair of M ′ , since
each member of U1 is assigned in M ′ . Now suppose that (u1i , p j) blocks M
′ . Then (u1i , ti) ∈ M ′ and p j is under-subscribed.
Thus no edge of M is incident to ui or w j in G . Hence M ∪ {{ui,w j}} is a matching in G , contradicting the maximality
of M . Thus M ′ admits no blocking pair.
We next verify that M ′ is also coalition-free. Clearly no student in S can be involved in a coalition, since any such
student who is assigned in M has his ﬁrst choice. Similarly no student who is assigned in M to a project in R can be in a
coalition. As a consequence no student in U who has his second choice can be in a coalition, since each such student prefers
only a project in R . Finally, no student in U1 who has his fourth choice can be in a coalition, since no assigned student
prefers a project in T to his project in M . Hence M ′ is stable. Finally we note that |M ′| = 2|M| + 2(n1 − |M|)+ (n2 − |M|) =
2n1 + n2 − |M|, and hence s+(I) 2n1 + n2 − β−1 (G).
Conversely, suppose that M ′ is a stable matching in I such that |M ′| = s+(I). For each r j ∈ R , it follows that r j is assigned
either u1j or u
2
j , for otherwise (u
1
j , r j) blocks M
′ , a contradiction. Hence
M = {{ui,w j} ∈ E: (u1i , p j) ∈ M ′ ∨ (u2i , p j) ∈ M ′}
is a matching in G . Suppose that M is not maximal. Then there is some edge {ui,w j} in G such that no edge of M is
incident to ui or w j . Thus by construction of M , either (i) (u1i , ti) ∈ M ′ , or u1i is unassigned in M ′ , or (ii) u2i is unassigned
in M ′ . Also p j is under-subscribed, and either w j is under-subscribed or (s j,q j) ∈ M ′ . In case (i), it follows that (u1i , p j)
blocks M ′ , whilst in case (ii), it follows that (u2i , p j) blocks M
′ . This contradiction to the stability of M ′ implies that M is
indeed maximal.
For each {ui,w j} ∈ M , it follows that (uzi , p j) ∈ M ′ for some z (1 z  2). Thus (u3−zi , ri) ∈ M ′ . Hence at most n1 − |M|
projects in T are full in M ′ . Also by construction of M , it follows that |M| projects in P are full in M ′ . Hence at most
n2 − |M| projects in Q are full in M ′ . It follows that |M ′| |M| + (n2 − |M|) + n1 + (n1 − |M|) = 2n1 + n2 − |M| and thus
s+(I) 2n1 + n2 − β−1 (G).
Hence s+(I) + β−1 (G) = 2n1 + n2. Now 2n1 = 3n2, as G is the subdivision graph of the cubic graph G ′ . Also m = 2n1,
where m is the number of edges in G . Let n be the number of students in I . Then n = 2n1 + n2.
Let c0 and δ0 be the constants given by Theorem 1, such that it is NP-hard to distinguish between the cases β
−
1 (G) c0m
and β−1 (G) > δ0c0m. Hence if β
−
1 (G)  c0m, then s+(I)  c1n, whilst if β
−
1 (G) > δ0c0m, then s
+(I) < (1/δ1)c1n, where
c1 = 4−3c04 and δ1 = 4−3c04−3δ0c0 . The result then follows by Theorem 1 and Proposition 3. 
4. Approximation algorithm
The NP-hardness of max-spa-p naturally leads to the question of the approximability of this problem. In this section we
present an approximation algorithm for max-spa-p that has a performance guarantee of 2.
Consider the algorithm spa-p-approx shown in Fig. 4, which is an extension of the resident-oriented Gale/Shapley algo-
rithm for the Hospitals/Residents problem [6, Section 1.6.3]. Our algorithm involves a sequence of apply and delete operations
to obtain a stable matching that is at least half the size of optimal. At each iteration of the while loop, some unassigned
student si with a non-empty preference list applies to the ﬁrst project p j on his list. If p j is full, then si is rejected and p j
is deleted from si ’s list. If lk is full (where lk offers p j), and p j is lk ’s worst non-empty project, then si is also rejected and
p j is deleted from si ’s list. Otherwise si becomes provisionally assigned to p j . If lk becomes over-subscribed as a result of
this assignment, then lk rejects an arbitrary student sr from pz , and pz is deleted from sr ’s list. Next, if lk is full (irrespective
of whether lk was over-subscribed earlier in the same loop iteration), then each project pt that lk ﬁnds less desirable than
his worst non-empty project is deleted from the preference list of each student who ﬁnds pt acceptable.
We will show that spa-p-approx produces a stable matching at least half the size of optimal. Firstly, using the following
four lemmas, we prove that the algorithm returns a matching (Lemma 5) that admits no coalition (Lemma 6) and no
blocking pair (Lemmas 7 and 8), and therefore the algorithm returns a stable matching.
Lemma 5. spa-p-approx terminates with a matching.
Proof. Clearly the while loop terminates. For, at the beginning of some loop iteration, let si be a student who is unassigned
and has a non-empty list, and let p j be the ﬁrst project on si ’s list. If si does not become provisionally assigned to p j
during the same loop iteration, then p j is removed from si ’s list. If si does become provisionally assigned to p j during this
loop iteration then some student sr may become unassigned; in this case p j is deleted from sr ’s list. Hence eventually, we
are guaranteed that each student is either assigned to some project or has an empty list. Let M be the assignment relation
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while (some student si is unassigned and si has a non-empty list) {
p j = ﬁrst project on si ’s list;
lk = lecturer who offers p j ;
pz = lk ’s worst project;
if (lk is non-empty)
pz = lk ’s worst non-empty project;
/* si applies to p j */
if (p j is full or (lk is full and p j = pz))
delete p j from si ’s list; (1)
else {
M = M ∪ {(si, p j)};
/* si is provisionally assigned to p j and to lk */
if (lk is over-subscribed) {
sr = some student in M(pz);
M = M\{(sr , pz)};
delete pz from sr ’s list; (2)
}
if (lk is full) {
pz = lk ’s worst non-empty project;
for (each successor pt of pz on lk ’s list)
for (each student sr who ﬁnds pt acceptable)
delete pt from sr ’s list; (3)
}
}
}
Fig. 4. Approximation algorithm spa-p-approx for max-spa-p.
upon termination of spa-p-approx. It is immediate that each student is assigned to at most one project in M , whilst no
project or lecturer is over-subscribed in M . 
Lemma 6. spa-p-approx returns a matching that is coalition-free.
Proof. By Lemma 5, let M be the matching output by an execution E of spa-p-approx. Suppose for a contradiction that
M admits a coalition {si0 , si1 , . . . , sir−1 } for some r  2. In what follows, the concept of a pair (si, p j) being deleted refers
to the operation of p j being deleted from si ’s preference list during some iteration of the while loop during E . For each
j (0  j  r − 1), (si j ,M(si j+1)) must have been deleted during an iteration of the while loop during E . Without loss
of generality, suppose that the coalition is ordered such that (si0 ,M(si1 )) is the ﬁrst deletion of the form (si j ,M(si j+1))
(0 j  r − 1) to take place during E . Let pz = M(si1 ) and let lk be the lecturer who offers pz . We consider the following
four cases (in what follows, all instances of the term deletion point i, for i = 1,2,3, refer to the deletion operation commented
by (i) in the pseudocode shown in Fig. 4).
Case 1: pz was deleted from si0 ’s list at deletion point 1, as a result of pz being full during E . Then si1 must have applied
to pz after si0 did, for if not, then si1 was already assigned to pz when si0 applied to pz . Hence M(si2 ) must already have
been deleted from si1 ’s list, a contradiction, since (si0 , pz) is the ﬁrst deletion of the form (si j ,M(si j+1 )) (0  j  r − 1).
Therefore pz must have gone from being full to being under-subscribed during E . This can only happen if lk became over-
subscribed during E , and pz was lk ’s worst non-empty project at that point. Thus when si1 applied to pz , it follows that pz
was still lk ’s worst non-empty project, and lk was full. Therefore lk rejected si1 from pz , a contradiction. Hence no coalition
exists in this case.
Case 2: pz was deleted from si0 ’s list at deletion point 1, as a result of lk being full during E , and pz was lk ’s worst
non-empty project. As in Case 1, si1 must have applied to pz after si0 did. Thus when si1 applied to pz , lk must have been
full and his worst non-empty project was pz . Hence si1 was rejected from pz , a contradiction. Hence no coalition exists in
this case.
Case 3: pz was deleted from si0 ’s list at deletion point 2, as a result of lk being over-subscribed during E . Then just
before the deletion occurred, pz was lk ’s worst non-empty project. The remainder of this case is similar to Case 2.
Case 4: pz was deleted from si0 ’s list at deletion point 3, as a result of lk being full during E . Then pz is removed from
si1 ’s list as well, a contradiction. Hence no coalition exists in this case. 
Lemma 7. Suppose that some project pt is deleted from a student sr ’s list during an execution of spa-p-approx. Then (sr, pt) cannot
block a matching output by spa-p-approx.
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By Lemma 5, let M be the matching output at the termination of E . Suppose for a contradiction that (sr, pt) blocks M . We
consider the following four cases.
Case 1: pt was deleted from sr ’s list at deletion point 1, as a result of pt being full during E . Since (sr, pt) blocks M , pt
is under-subscribed in M . Hence pt changed from being full during E to being under-subscribed, which can only occur as a
result of lecturer lk being over-subscribed during E , where pt was lk ’s worst non-empty project at that point. Thus lk is full
in M , and lk ’s worst non-empty project is either pt or better. Hence (sr, pt) does not block M in this case.
Case 2: pt was deleted from sr ’s list at deletion point 1, as a result of lk being full during E , and pt was lk ’s worst
non-empty project. Clearly on termination of E , lk is full, and lk ’s worst non-empty project is pt or better. Hence (sr, pt)
does not block M in this case.
Case 3: pt was deleted from sr ’s list at deletion point 2, as a result of lk being over-subscribed during E . Then just before
the deletion occurred, pt was lk ’s worst non-empty project. Now lk is full in M , and lk ’s worst non-empty project is either
pt or better. Hence (sr, pt) does not block M in this case.
Case 4: pt was deleted from sr ’s list at deletion point 3, as a result of lk being full during E . Then lk is full in M , and lk
prefers his worst non-empty project to pt . Hence (sr, pt) does not block M in this case. 
Lemma 8. spa-p-approx returns a stable matching.
Proof. Let E be an execution of the algorithm, and by Lemma 5, let M be the matching output upon termination of E .
Suppose that (si, p j) blocks M . By Lemma 7, p j is not deleted from si ’s list during E . Hence si ’s list is non-empty upon
termination of E . If si is unassigned in M then the while loop would not have terminated, a contradiction. Hence si is
assigned in M and prefers p j to pr = M(si). But when si applied to pr , pr was the ﬁrst project on si ’s list, a contradiction.
Hence, and by Lemma 6, M is stable. 
It follows by Lemma 8 that spa-p-approx is an approximation algorithm for max-spa-p. Moreover, using a suitable choice
of data structures, the algorithm may be implemented to run in time linear in the length of the given preference lists. The
following is therefore immediate.
Corollary 9. Every instance I of spa-p admits at least one stable matching, and such a matching may be found in O (λ) time, where λ
is the total length of the preference lists in I .
The next result shows that spa-p-approx has a performance guarantee of 2.
Lemma 10. Let I be an instance of spa-p. Then |M| 2|M ′| for any stable matchings M, M ′ in I .
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that |M ′| < |M|/2. Let X (respectively, Y ) be those students who are assigned in M but
not M ′ (respectively, M ′ but not M), and let Z be those students who are assigned in both M and M ′ . Then
|X | = |M| − |Z | > 2|M ′| − |Z | = 2|Y | + |Z | |M ′|. (1)
Now suppose that the students in X are collectively assigned in M to projects P ′ = {p1, . . . , ps} offered by lecturers
l1, . . . , lt . Suppose that P ′1, . . . , P ′t is a partition of P ′ such that lecturer lk (1 k  t) offers the projects in P ′k . Similarly let
S1, . . . , St be a partition of X such that each student in Sk is assigned in M to a project in P ′k (1 k t).
Now let k be given (1 k t) and let p j be any project in P ′k . Then there is some student si ∈ Sk who is assigned to p j
in M but unassigned in M ′ . Hence in M ′ , either (i) p j is full, or (ii) lk is full (or both), for otherwise (si, p j) blocks M ′ . It
follows that, in M ′ , either (a) all projects in P ′k are full, or (b) lk is full (or both). Hence
|M ′|
t∑
k=1
min
(
dk,
∑
p j∈P ′k
c j
)
. (2)
Since no project or lecturer is over-subscribed in M , it follows that, for each k (1 k  t),
∑
p j∈P ′k c j  |Sk| and dk  |Sk|.
Hence (2) implies that |M ′|∑tk=1 |Sk| = |X |, which is a contradiction to (1). Thus |M ′| |M|/2 as required. 
The above lemmas lead to the following conclusion.
Theorem 11. spa-p-approx is an approximation algorithm for max-spa-p with a performance guarantee of 2.
To demonstrate that the analysis given in the proof of Lemma 10 is tight, it is straightforward to construct an instance
of spa-p such that the algorithm spa-p-approx could produce a stable matching that is half the size of optimal. For, consider
the instance of spa-p shown in Fig. 5, where S = {s1, . . . , s2n}, P = {p1, . . . , p2n} and L = {l1, . . . , ln}. The matching M =
560 D.F. Manlove, G. O’Malley / Journal of Discrete Algorithms 6 (2008) 553–560Student preferences Lecturer preferences
s2i−1: p2i−1 p2i (1 i  n) lk: p2k−1 p2k (1 k n)
s2i: p2i−1 (1 i  n)
c j = 1 (1 j  2n)
dk = 2 (1 k n)
Fig. 5. An instance I3 of spa-p.
{(s2i−1, p2i), (s2i, p2i−1): 1  i  n} is the unique maximum stable matching, of size 2n. On the other hand, during an
execution of spa-p-approx, if the students apply to projects in increasing indicial order, we obtain the stable matching
M ′ = {(s2i−1, p2i−1): 1 i  n}, of size n.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have considered a model for the Student-Project Allocation problem (spa) in which both students
and lecturers have preferences over projects. As noted in Section 1, a spa model in which lecturers have preferences over
students has also been studied [1,2]. It remains to investigate algorithmic issues for a more general preference model for
the lecturers, involving preferences over (student, project) pairs. Some detailed initial observations regarding this case are
made in [2].
For the spa-p model, involving lecturer preferences over projects, this paper showed that the problem of ﬁnding a maxi-
mum stable matching is NP-hard, though admits an approximation algorithm, spa-p-approx, with a performance guarantee of
2. In practice, spa-p-approx is likely to construct a stable matching whose size is closer to optimal than a factor of 1/2, nev-
ertheless the question remains as to whether there exists an approximation algorithm for max-spa-p that has a performance
guarantee less than 2.
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